Executive Summary
Concerns about Nigeria’s ability to hold a peaceful general election in 2015 have
characterised the work of governance, peace and security sector practitioners and
policymakers for some time now. The prevailing discourse emanating from Nigerian
and international actors alike predominantly focuses on the actions (and inaction) of
major stakeholders, including Nigeria’s ruling and opposition political parties, mass
media and civil society, and the international community. Nigeria’s upcoming polls
are significant, with the potential to make or mar the country’s democracy and
threaten its peace and security and, by extension, the stability of the West African
region and of the continent.
The outcome of the election will largely depend on preparations and the
administration of processes by Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC) before, during and after the polls. This Policy & Practice Brief (PPB) primarily
aims to explore Nigeria’s readiness for the election. It draws attention to challenges
affecting planning in Nigeria and highlights opportunities that can be harnessed to
ensure a free and fair election, with a result that is nationally accepted. The brief
assesses the national, regional and international significance of the polls. It analyses
the INEC’s preparations for them, as well as the impact of salient contextual issues
on the electoral process and its outcomes.
It also reflects on opportunities for and limitations to the effective administration of
the election. Despite advances in preparing for the polls, there are notable
challenges in Nigeria which could negatively affect the March 2015 vote and call into
question both the fairness of the process and its results, if no urgent steps are taken
to address them. The brief concludes by advancing recommendations for various
stakeholders which, if applied, could be useful in ensuring that the election in Africa’s
most populous nation and biggest economy is free and fair, and that its outcome is
supportive of peace and stability in the country, and the region.
Introduction
As Nigeria prepares for the 28 March 2015 election, there are already causes for
concern over whether the vote will be free, fair and peaceful. For one, the language
used at political rallies and events by members of all political parties remains violent
and divisive. In the run-up to the election, ethnic and religious chauvinists have
reportedly been stoking the fire of violence during electioneering. The northern part
of the country insists that power must return to it, as sitting President Goodluck
Jonathan, who originates from Nigeria’s south–south zone, insists on a second term
in office.
While the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) seems to have suffered setbacks
as a result of unprecedented fictionalisation and defections, a number of leading
opposition parties have capitalised on this to merge and form a ‘mega party’ through
which to challenge the ruling party. Adding to the problems in Nigeria is that national
security has continued to deteriorate, to such an extent that the situation provided an
excuse for the military and other security agencies to ‘force’ the INEC to postpone
, the election – originally scheduled for 14 February – to 28 March. Together, these
developments appear to have reduced the level of public trust in Nigeria’s electoral
process and may negatively affect the level and quality of citizens’ participation in the
vote. Thus, unless fundamental transformation is achieved before the polling date –
which is highly unlikely, based on past trends – the odds are against the election
being well-administered, which may generate a crisis of legitimacy and cause the
results to be called into question.
The significance of Nigeria’s 2015 election
Nigeria’s 2015 election has important democratic, development and peace and
security implications at national, regional and international levels. Muhammadu
Buhari,1 presidential candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC) party in
Nigeria, explained during a Chatham House lecture that ‘Nigerians and the whole
world are intensely focused on this year’s elections’ for a number of reasons, ‘chief
of which is that the elections are holding [sic] in the shadow of huge security,
economic and social uncertainties in Africa’s most populous country and largest
economy’.2
This year’s election is the fifth since 1999, when Nigeria returned to civilian rule. If
well administered in terms of fulfilling the most basic democratic requirements of
elections: competition, participation and legitimacy,3 the poll will strengthen Nigeria’s
prospects for democratic rule and national development. The success of the election
largely depends on how effectively state security measures to minimise occurrences
of post-election violence, as observed during 2011, are implemented and managed.
Violence and unrest in the run-up to the 2011 polls claimed the lives of more than
800 people and led to the displacement of approximately 65 000.4 As this is the first
time that Nigerians cast their ballots since then, how the country votes this year
could highlight whether crucial lessons were learnt, or not, from the events of 2011.
A key challenge is that the election will be held on the backdrop of the violent
insurgency by Boko Haram, a militant group which is particularly affecting the north-
eastern part of the country. Given the politicisation and manipulation of the upheaval
to assume an ethno-regional and religious character, as well as the unprecedented
fractionalisation of some elites along these fault lines of identity,5 the pending
election has taken on the appearance of a referendum on the survival of the country.
That Boko Haram’s activities have featured prominently in the campaign messages
of the two leading political parties, the PDP and the main opposition APC, lends
some credence to this rationalisation.
Former Foreign Affairs Minister Professor Bolaji Akinyemi implied this in an open
letter to the two leading presidential candidates, Goodluck Jonathan and
Muhammadu Buhari, in which he maintained that ‘the certainty of violence after the
2015 elections is higher than it was in 2011. If President Jonathan wins, the North
would erupt into violence as it did in 2011. If Buhari wins, the Niger Delta will erupt
into violence. I don’t believe that we need rocket science to make this
prediction’.6 The signs that this extrapolation may be proved are already visible, with
threats and counter-threats emerging from both sides; most notably by ex-Niger
Delta militants, particularly Asari Dokubo.7