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Philosophy of Mind content summary
- Course
- Philosophy 244
- Institution
- Stellenbosch University (SUN)
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Topic 1 — Introduction to The Philosophy of MindJaegwon Kim explains the philosophy of mind using the example of living and non-living things. Kim
believes we are automatically, without hesitation, able to make a distinction between things that are living
versus things that aren’t. In the same way, Kim believes we also have an intuition for knowing which
creatures have minds and which do not.
WHY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND?
Kim says we intuitively assume, and are able to make a dsitinction, between creatures with a mind and
without a mind. We can do this without empirical evidence, without thinking about it, etc. This is one of the
most basic contrasts that we use in our thoughts about the world. It is one of the ways that we organise and
categorise concepts. Therefore, it affects our attitude towards those entities (if we believe they have capacity
to feel pain and pleasure, for example).
According to Kim, we also assume that humans have particularly highly-developed mind. We believe we
occupy a special and higher place in the world. We make a distinction not only between things with and
without minds, but also between the mental capacities of animals such as cats and human beings. We have
the capacity for rational deliberation (and the ability to take action based on this), emotions such as empathy,
compassion, etc.
ANIMALS
Moreover, we make distinctions between other living things’ capacity to have a mind. While we believe that
some animals have minds, we do not, for example, believe that plants have minds. When considering the
minds of animals, such as pets or chimpanzees, we think that these animals are conscious and can feel
sensations such as pain or pleasure and they have the same relationship to their spatial awareness as we do.
Animals also seem to remember things and learn from their experiences, adapting their behaviour to different
environments. They also seem capable of feeling complex emotions such as fear, anger, embarrassment, etc.
However, we have to questions whether they are capable of having intentions? rational deliberation? decision
making? logical reasoning? Also: Can we regard the consciousness of all animals as the same thing? Is the
mind of an oyster the same as that of a person’s pet cat?
We all become aware of some hierarchy of animal life (humans —> domestic animals —> animals such as
chimpanzees —> animals such as oysters, crabs, earthworms, etc.). The qualities of consciousness that we
ascribe to animals become fewer and fewer as we move down the hierarchy. Just as human beings can react
stimuli, we can recognise that creatures such as earthworms also have sensations as they react in appropriate
ways to stimuli. However, does this mean that they have minds in the same way that we have minds? Or in
the same way that cats and dogs have minds?
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
If even oysters and crabs have minds, albeit not in the same way as humans or other animals, the question
then becomes: what does it mean to have a mind? What does it mean to say that humans have mind? And,
furthermore, what is it to say that humans have minds but very highly-developed artificial intelligence do not
have minds?
QUESTIONS ASKED BY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
One of the starting points in figuring out what it means to have a mind is to know how this question differs
from the scientific/psychological approach. There is a completely separate set of problems that can only be
solved by philosophy and not the hard sciences, including:
1. What is “mentality?” What conditions must an individual or a system meet, to attribute it a mind? We
automatically distinguish between mental phenomena (ex: sensation) and non-mental phenomena (ex:
digestion), but is there a specific characteristic that distinguishes the two from one another?
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,2. Questions regarding specific mental properties/states. These include questions such as: are pains only
sensory or do they also have motivational components? Can there be pains of which we are not at all
aware? Do emotions such as anger and jealousy necessarily involve fault qualities or do they involve a
cognitive component like belief? And, furthermore, what is a belief?
3. Relationship between mind and bodies. This is one of the most important questions asked by
philosophy of mind— known as the mind-body problem. How do we go about understanding the
relationship between a purely mental mind and a purely physical body?
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
The mind-body problem has been a central problem in the philosophy of mind since Descartes introduced it
4 centuries ago. However, it still remains an unsolved problem. The reason that it is so difficult to answer
this question is that the mental seems so utterly different from the physical and yet it seems as if the two
always occur together. The properties that make up our physical body seem fundamentally different from the
properties that make up our cognitive life; at the same time, there seems to be a unison between the two.
Conscious phenomena do not appear in isolation, however. There are many biological processes related to
them. So, how can these biological systems come to have states like fear and hope, as well as experience
these complex emotions like guilt and pride, and then have reason and act on it? There seems to be an
unbridgeable gap between mental and physical phenomena, making their intimate relationship so mysterious
to us.
We know that physical events lead to mental experiences because when someone steps on a thumb-tac for
example, they experience a sharp pain as result of the neurones in the brain firing and registering the pain.
But how exactly can this physical event become a conscious experience? How does a sensation or conscious
experiences result from a purely physical and biological process? Why is it that we experience a mental
experience depending on some physical process, why is not the other way around?
It seems we make assumptions that mental processes lead to physical events. How does the perception and
desire for food, for example, manage to result in a person’s body moving to a restaurant across the street?
While this may seem simple in terms of biology, it does not make sense that these could lead to physical
events unless the beliefs and desires themselves are physical processes in the brain?
- If yes: how? and why?
- If no: what exactly are mental processes? and what is their relationship to the brain? can a
philosophical reflection analysis be provided? This is known as the problem of mental-causation.
In contemporary philosophy of mind, the world is believed to be generally material. How, then, can we
accommodate minds and mentality in such a material/physical world?
“HAVING A MIND”
It is important to note that the concept of a mind is not necessarily referring to the brain. This is for a number
of reasons, including that:
1. Brain has many processes that are not mental.
2. Some mental properties can occur outside the brain (e.g. calculation/computing).
3. Mind and brain have different properties.
Instead, for Descartes, having a “mind” has a literal meaning. Minds are things of a special and a particular
kind. The mental is equal to the soul, or an immaterial substance existing outside of time and space. Thus,
the mind exists outside of physical space because it involves things that cannot be described in terms of
physical processes, (ex: essential properties such as thinking and being conscious).
This assumption is not currently widespread. Kim argues that “having a mind need not be like having brown
eyes or a laptop.” Instead “having a mind” should be taken in the same nonliteral sense as “dancing a waltz
or taking a walk.” We do not suppose that a mind is an external object which can be obtained. Rather, it is
assumed to be a certain group of mental properties, features, and capacities that are unique to conscious
beings. To say that a creature “has a mind,” is to say that they posses these characteristics such as sensation,
perception, memory, learning, reasoning, consciousness, etc.
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,IMPORTANT TERMINOLOGY
- Substances— refer to certain objects or things. This can be persons, biological organs, molecules, etc.
Substances have various properties which stand in relation to each other. Properties and relations are
together called attributes. Hence, some substances (ex: people) have the property of “mentality.”
- A process can be thought of as a series of causally connected events (and events are different from states
as they suggest change while states do not).
- We also talk about both physical and mental events, states, processes and facts as phenomena.
- Some events can also be physical. These include objects and phenomena studied in physics, but also the
chemical, biological, etc. Physical properties include: hard, three-dimensional, consists of atoms, conducts
electricity, red. (How does the property of the mental fit in here?)
Mind-Body theories:
- Materialism is the theory that all things that exist in the world are bits of matter or aggregates of bits of
matter.
- Physicalism is the theory that all things that exist are entities recognized by the science of physics, or
systems aggregated out of such entities (e.g. energy, particles, forces). These physical systems can,
however, have non-physical properties.
NB: As physicalism is the contemporary successor of materialism, throughout the course the two terms will
be used interchangeably. Still, it is important to be aware of the differences between the two.
VARIETIES OF MENTAL PHENOMENA
There are 4 major categories of mental events and states:
1. Sensations —pain, itch, sight, smell, etc. This phenomena involves sensations and sensory qualities,
such as seeing a sunset, touching a hot stove, etc. These kinds of conscious experiences are a type of
mental event.
These mental states have a phenomenal/qualitative character— that is, “there is something it is like
to experience such states which is distinctive.” We can say, for example, that there is something it is
like to experience pain which is distinctive from experiencing an itch. This type of experience is
called qualia. Qualia are the experiences that make up phenomenal consciousness and we have
direct access to them.
2. Intentionality — mental phenomena that is directed at something or has content. It is often expressed in
a “that” clause (known as a content sentence). These states involve a subject having an attitude toward a
proposition.
For example, Amy hopes that she passes her exams. The intentionality of the subject (Amy) is
directed at something (passing her exams) or bears content. It is content-bearing because it has
meaning that can be communicated.
Do these mental states have a phenomenal/qualitative aspect as sensations do? Is there something it
is like to have these intentions or express this hope? There does not seem to be a common quality
associated with these beliefs. Instead, we often ascribe propositional attitudes to other people and to
ourselves. Thus, these attitudes do not necessarily have a felt aspect like sensations do (in other
words, there is not something it is like to feel these propositions.)
3. Feelings and emotions — anger, happiness, embarrassment, etc.
Emotions are often attributed to persons with a that clause and therefore some states of emotions can
contain clauses (ex: Amy feels embarrassed that she did not call her mother on her birthday). There
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, is often qualitative aspect associated with feelings and emotions. Furthermore, feeling and emotions
can also entail propositional attitudes and beliefs.)
4. Volitions — intending, deciding, willing. These can be thought of a combination of propositional
attitudes (because intending and willing involve attitudes) and action.
When you decide to do something and then actually do it, this process is preceded by volitions.
When intending to lift your arm now, for example, you must be prepared to take the necessary action
to do so and then initiate and follow through on it. This does not mean that you cannot change your
mind or that you will be successful, only that if doing so, you would have to change your intentions.
Intentional actions must be proceeded by volition.
There appears to be something mental about lifting your arm, rather than it being only physical. It
seems to be a result of desire and intentions. Kim gives the following example of buying a loaf of
bread: “Evidently someone who can engage in the act of buying a loaf of bread must have
appropriate beliefs and desires; she must, for example, have a desire to buy bread, or at least a desire
to buy something, and knowledge of what bread is. And to do something like buying, you must have
knowledge, or beliefs, about what constitutes buying rather than, say, borrowing or simply taking,
about money and exchange of goods, and so on. That is to say, only creatures with beliefs and
desires and an understanding of appropriate social conventions and institutions can engage in
activities like buying and selling.”
The same goes for much of what we do as social beings; actions like promising, greeting, and
apologising presuppose a rich and complex background of beliefs, desires, and intentions, as well as
an understanding of social relationships and arrangements.
IS THERE A MARK OF THE MENTAL?
We have seen that there is some overlap between different categories mental states, such as the involvement
of propositional attitudes in volition and intentionality. Therefore, we have to ask, is there some
characteristic or feature by virtue of which these states are all described as mental? Is there a mark of the
mental?
Different possible answers have been proposed, and although they may not serve as universal marks of
mentality, they do provide a starring point in attempting to answer what seems like an impossible question.
Some potential “mentality” criteria are proposed, including: a) epistemology, b) non-spatiality, and c)
intentionality.
EPISTEMOLOGY
Epistemological view has to do with the fundamental ways in which we come to have knowledge. Kim uses
the example of experiencing a tooth-ache caused by an exposed nerve. He explains that the tooth-ache is a
mental experience. However, the condition of the molar, is not. What, then, distinguishes the two
phenomena? Some possible answers are:
- The distinction exists in certain fundamental differences in the way in which we come to have knowledge
about the two phenomena. Knowledge of the tooth-ache, on the one hand, comes from direct or
immediate knowledge (to you) or introspection. You do not need to make any inference or know anything
about dentistry to know that you have a tooth-ache. On there other hand, knowing that you have an
exposed nerve would have to come from a third-party of knowledge (ex: your dentist’s knowledge of
dentistry).
The challenge arises however, that we cannot say this is exclusive to the mental. Can it not be the
same for physical experiences? Don’t I know, in the same way that I know I have a tooth-ache, that
there is a tree just outside my window?
- This alternative explanation suggests that the distinction exists because of “Privacy” or First-person
Privilege — that is, because no-one else can know our mental states as we know them.
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