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Summary Notes on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth

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1952
notes on the pragmatic theory of truth authors moreland perkins source the journal of philosophy
aug 28
vol 49
no 18 aug 28
1952
pp 573 587 published by journal of philosophy

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Notes on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth
Author(s): Moreland Perkins
Source: The Journal of Philosophy , Aug. 28, 1952, Vol. 49, No. 18 (Aug. 28, 1952), pp.
573-587
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

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, VOLUME XLIX, No. 18 AUGUST 28, 1952

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

NOTES ON THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH

A LTHOUGH pragmatism has been primarily an analysis of
cognition and its validation, the largest portion of the criti-
cisms of this philosophy have been aimed at its theory of truth.
Critics have most often taken the pragmatists' conception of truth
to be the core of the doctrine. For example, Russell, writing in
1908, remarks that:

. . .the cardinal point in the pragmatist philosophy, namely its theory of
truth, is so new, and necessary to the rest of the philosophy . . . that its
inventors cannot be regarded as merely developing the thoughts of . . .
predecessors.'

And writing forty years later Russell again notes that:

Pragmatism, as it appears in James, is primarily a new definition of "truth." 2
From the strictly philosophical point of view, the chief importance of Dewey's
work lies in his criticism of the traditional notion of "truth" which is em-
bodied in the theory he calls instrumentalism.3

Similar emphasis upon the theory of truth in pragmatism can be
found in many writers.4
I believe that it is a mistake to construe the conception of truth
as the central notion in pragmatism. It is rather their conception
of knowledge which deserves that position. However, I shall not
argue that point. Instead I shall consider some of the misunder-
standings of the pragmatic view of truth which are in part respon-
sible for the critics' emphasis on this subject. I shall also try to
indicate what seems to me to be the chief source of these misunder-
standings.
It will be convenient to limit the discussion more or less to the
writings of William James. For James possesses the double ad-
vantage of having written a great deal on the explicit subject of

1 Philosophical Essays, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York, 1910, p. 88.
2 A History of Western Philosophy, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1945,
p. 816.
3 Ibid., p. 820.
4 See, for example, G. E. Moore 's article on James in Philosophical
Studies; W. P. Montague, Ways of Knowing, Macmillan Co., New York, 1925,
pp. 147, 162-164; and J. B. Pratt, What Is Pragmatism? Macmillan Co., New
York, 1909, especially pp. 87, 113, 116-117.

573

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, 574 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

truth and of having expressed views susceptible to the kind of
serious misinterpretation I wish to remove. Peirce lacks the latter
advantage and Dewey the former.
In the first part of the paper I shall deal with the relation of
truth to verification in James, and in the second part with the
bearing of the semantic conception of truth upon James's treat-
ment of the subject.

Criticisms of the pragmatic theory of truth (and, indeed, of
their philosophy in general) have focused upon three assertions
which have been credited to the pragmatists. They are the follow-
ing:

(1) Truth is the same as verification.
(2) The true is the useful or satisfactory or successful (in be-
liefs).
(3) The truth or falsehood of a belief or statement is not fixed
and eternal but is mutable.

But both (2) and (3) are, insofar as they are to be found in the
pragmatic writings, corollaries of (1). If (1) is justifiably at-
tributed to the pragmatist then (2) follows by a substitution of his
definition of verification. And if (1) is justifiably attributed to
the pragmatist then (3) follows in virtue of the mutability of the
status of any belief or statement with respect to its degree of veri-
fication or falsification. The first proposition is, then, the strategic
one. If it is not accepted by the pragmatist then the evidence for
their acceptance of the second two becomes negligible, and much of
the criticism of pragmatism is nullified.
Numerous writers have found this identification of truth and
verification in pragmatism. For example, Pratt writes:

. . . [the pragmatist] deduces the rather amazing conclusion that since its
usefulness proves it true, its trueness consists in its usefulness. The test of
truth and the meaning of truth are thus completely identified.5

And Russell argues:

At first sight it might seem a perfectly proper inductive proceeding to
inquire what properties a belief must have in order that we may call it true,
and to infer that those properties constitute the meaning of "truth." There
is, however, a fallacy in this method of inquiry; and this fallacy, in our
opinion, is at the bottom of the whole pragmatic philosophy.6

5 op. cit., p. 89.
e Philosophical Essays, pp. 137-138.

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